Charter s32 makes it clear that the Charter only
applies to governments, and not to people, private individuals, businesses or
other organizations who are not an enumerated class of subject of any juristic
Lawmakers were given authority by the people to
legislate codes, rules, regulations, and statutes which are policies,
procedures, and “law” to control the behavior of bureaucrats, elected and
appointed officials, municipalities and agencies but were never given authority
to control the behavior of the people as we read in a US Supreme court decision
"All codes, rules, and regulations are for government authorities only,
not human/Creators in accordance with God's laws. All codes, rules, and
regulations are unconstitutional and lacking due process…" -- Rodriques v.
"The common law is the real law, the Supreme
Law of the land, the code, rules, regulations, policy and statutes are not the
law”, -- Self v. Rhay, 61 Wn (2d) 261
In these Civil Law Rulings we find the constitutionally
appoint superior courts judges who the provincial court systems also use in the
higher courts actually protecting private individuals in provincial courts.
Charter s32 and Canadian Judicial Council.
When dealing with enumerated classes of subjects
[government] it is all contract law that we have to consent to!
R v Duncan
R v Duncan was heard by Justice Fergus O’Donnell of the Ontario Court of Justice.
A minor alleged Highway Traffic Act offence — an unsignalled turn — led to an altercation with a police officer in the parking lot of Duncan’s apartment building. A request that Duncan produce his licence led to an alleged refusal to do so, an attempt to arrest him, a struggle, and the arrest of Duncan for allegedly assaulting a police officer. Justice O’Donnell acquitted Duncan of the charge because there was no lawful basis for the stop and thus no lawful basis for the demand for identification and thus no lawful basis for the arrest for failing to produce identification. As the arrest was unlawful, even if Duncan resisted, he was entitled to do so. The acquittal was entered as the result of something equivalent to a motion for non-suit that was made at the conclusion of the Crown’s case by the Court on Duncan’s behalf. It was a happy outcome for Duncan, but it came at a large cost to his dignity.
There is no doubt these Highway Traffic Act proceedings did include a number of the indicia of OPCA litigation that were listed by Justice Rooke in Meads. Duncan talked about being a split person, with both natural person and administrator aspects (footnote 1); he provided an “affidavit of truth” objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over him and denying he was a citizen of the country or province, a “person,” or someone with a contract with the court (at para 9); he produced a “fee schedule” just before his altercation with the police (at para 12); etc. In Meads Justice Rooke describes the uses of these concepts and tactics (and more) in other cases (at paras 199-253).
Mr. Duncan proclaimed that he had no obligation to produce identification to the police officers. In that moment Mr. Duncan momentarily hit upon the concept that would ultimately lead to his acquittal!
What really happened:
An unrebutted “affidavit of truth” is the law!
No consent to this statutory courts jurisdiction
not an enumerated class of subject of the province