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Government obligation to bijural court access

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Government obligation to bijural court access

Where to begin?

CASE "LAW" IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
As CASE "LAW" IS ENACTED BY THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

The judicial branch of government that cannot address the living man or woman. If you are standing in a statutory court you're a corporate sole not a human being with inalienable rights.

So the question is who are you? A human man or woman or enumerated as a class of subject that statutory courts apply to?

It is not up to the government to decide who you are! In fact they have rules and regulations allowing them to not tell you who you are!

The government is assuming rightly so that you have no idea who you are in relationship to them.

Let’s start with the British North America Act 1867:

Section 92. 14 - The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.

The Constitutionally named Courts are common law and equity courts. They do not address civil or criminal jurisdictions under the procedures in civil matters found in provincial courts.

Here, the Province of British Columbia created legislation called the Law and Equity Act. Having this in place gives the appearance that procedures in civil matters found in the Province of British Columbia courts can also address common law for the citizens of the province. However in bijural British Columbia not all of the people living here are citizens of the Province of British Columbia, under the jurisdiction of such courts.

This of course is done under and with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council not the common law Lieutenant Governor. Unfortunately in bijural British Columbia the people living here require common law and equity courts named in section 96 of the Constitution Act 1867 and do not fall under the jurisdiction of Provincial Courts and the procedures, regulations etc. found in those Courts that are applicable only to the citizens of the Province of British Columbia!

Section 96 - The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
That says the common law Governor General shall appoint. It does not say the civil law Governor General in Council!

Section 101 - The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada.

The General Court of Appeal of Canada addressed here is a common law and equity court.

The Civil Parliament of Canada would like us to believe that they have the authority to combine a common law court found in bijural Canada into their civil law courts. Which in effect has caused the common law courts that are required to be available for the common law society to vanish! We are to believe this is done without violating anyone’s inalienable right to their own court by the Governor General when in fact it is the Governor General in Council with its corporate sole that has done this.

That is the reason none of the acts creating these new courts at the federal level or the provincial level have been given Royal assent.

The Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor have had nothing to do with the creation of any court not named in the Constitution directly.
Common to Both

Let us start with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and look at the responsibilities of the corporations known as Canada and the Province of British Columbia:

Article 2.2 Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with constitutional processes and with the provisions or the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present covenant.
Article 5 1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
Rights and freedoms in Canada
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
From <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/FullText.html> 2015-11-05

1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free common law society living in British Columbia. A common law society that is not subject to the democratic civil law society government of the Province of British Columbia and its enactments that have not received Royal assent.

Definition of "free and democratic society"
free - 4 b :  not subject to government regulation From <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/free>
and -  conjunction 1. along or together with; as well as; in addition to; besides; From <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/and>
democratic - based on a form of government in which the people choose leaders by voting : of or relating to democracy From <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democratic>
society - Canada is a bijural country, having having two, common law and civil law systems

  • Section 7 - Section 7 guarantees the life, liberty and personal security of all Canadians. It also demands that governments respect the basic principles of justice whenever it intrudes on those rights.
  • Section 15 - Equality Rights - This section of the Charter makes it clear that every individual in Canada – regardless of race, religion, national or ethnic origin, colour, sex, age or physical or mental disability – is to be considered equal. This means that governments must not discriminate on any of these grounds in its laws or programs.
  • Section 26 - Canadians have rights under laws other than the Charter. For example, rights may also be created under federal, provincial and international law.
  • Section 31 - Nothing in this Charter extends the legislative powers of any body or authority. The powers of each level of government are set out in the Constitution Act, 1867.
  • Section 32 - The purpose of this section is to make it clear that the Charter only applies to the Parliament and government of Canada and to the legislature and government of each province, and not to private individuals, businesses or other organizations. (Notice the unusal use of capitalization used in the previous sentence.

Now consider that Canada and the province of in this case British Columbia are both corporations/businesses which apparently are not subject to the Charter.

Canadian Bill of Rights
Recognition and declaration of rights and freedoms
1 It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
• (a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law;
• (b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;

Federal Court Obligations

Constitution Act 1867 – General Court of Appeal, etc.

101. The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada. and -  conjunction 1. along or together with; as well as; in addition to; besides; From http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/and
 
According to section 101 of the Constitution Act 1867 there is only one Federal Court that still exist today that deals with common law and equity and the people found in the common law society in British Columbia and that is a General Court of Appeal for Canada. Any Court put forward at the federal level is a civil law, statute created and regulated Federal Court that does not have Royal assent or any authority over people who are not a class of subject enumerated in section 91 or section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867.

Provincial Court Obligations

Provincial Courts

Federal interpretation Act – superior court means
• (d) in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the Province, and

I fail to see where the federal civil Government has any authority over provincial courts. Charter Section 31 – Nothing in this Charter extends the legislative powers of any body or authority. The Charter in no way affects the sharing of responsibilities or the distribution of powers between the provinces and the federal government. The powers of each level of government are set out in the Constitution Act, 1867.

Both the BC Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of British Columbia are statute created, prescribed by regulations that did not receive Royal assent and violates the rights of people with imprescriptible rights.

The Superior, District and County Courts in British Columbia according to the Constitution Act section 96 are Courts of common law and equity. These courts are the only ones that can deal with people living in British Columbia with inalienable imprescriptible human rights. All other courts created by The Province of British Columbia lack jurisdiction over people not enumerated as a class of subject under section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867.

Constitution Act 1867 section 92. 14 - The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.

Legal Notice of court order regarding the BC Court access

Court order registered in the common law Superior Court of British Columbia

On Monday, February 22, 2016 an “exchange of consents” court order was registered in the Nanaimo County Courthouse regarding the Province of British Columbia Government and the affiant.

The court order was not rejected by the registrar and is therefore in good standing.

The court order was supported by an affidavit that was not rebutted in the time frame given.

The executive branch of the Province of British Columbia Government has 30 days from today Thursday, March 3, 2016 to satisfy the court order requirements.


Common Law Courts

 
Administration and delivery of Civil Law justice
 
The following all fall under civil society’s legal authority:
• Prosecution of offences under the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and provincial statutes.
• Provision of civil legal services to the government.
• Operation of the Provincial Court, Supreme Court and Court of Appeal
• Recognition and response to the needs of victims of crime.
 
Oh where, oh where, can those Common Law Courts be?
 
British North America Act 1867
 
·         Section 92. 14: The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts including those mentioned in section 96 of the British North America Act 1867
o   the constitutionally named courts are not part of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction assigned to the Province of British Columbia and its Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts, or the Superior Court, District Court and County Courts found in section 96 of the British North America Act 1867 but are housed in the bijural court houses used by civil law society.
·         Section 96: The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
o   the appointment of Superior Court Judges, which is done by the Governor General, not the Governor General in Council or Lieutenant Government in Council.
·         Section 101: he Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada.
o   The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada.
 

Our Inherent Jurisdiction Courts

There are only two types of courts available in any jurisdiction in Canada! Just like there are two types of citizens, those living in Canada, and those classes of subjects enumerated under federal or provincial authority.
 
As Diefenbaker said “I am a Canadian, a free Canadian or I am free to take part in the democratic society!”
 
In Constitutional terms you are either enumerated as a class of subject prescribed with duties and rights under the civil government of that democratic society’s authority or you are not.
 
You are either a Canadian Citizen prescribed under civil government enactments and authority with rights or freedoms protected by the Charter, or you are a Canadian Citizen, a private individual who has rights and freedoms protected by the constitution!
 
You are either a Canadian Citizen subject to civil government enactment created courts or you are not!
 
Court Type number one – the common law court!

These common law courts are courts of common law and equity and are true inherent jurisdiction courts and were in place when the Dominion of Canada came into existence.

These courts are not subject to prescribed enactments created by either the Parliament of Canada or the Province of British Columbia which have not received Royal assent. But statue law that violates the constitution are subject to the jurisdiction of these inherent jurisdiction courts.

Court Type number two – civil law courts claiming to have inherent jurisdiction!

Some enactments created under federal or provincial statutes that were never given Royal assent claim that there named Courts have inherent jurisdiction. Which is true as long as the people involved in these courts or classes of subjects enumerated in either section 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act 1867. These are not courts that any member of the common law society should be in attendance of without challenging the court’s jurisdiction.
----
Court Fees

The British North America Act 1867 laid the ground work the Canadian common law federation with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom which dates back 800 years to the Magna Carta.

Magna Carta (40) To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.

October 2, 2014 - High court strikes down B.C. court fees

B.C.’s SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA originally ruled the fees unconstitutional. Which is very true because of charter s32 and the trespass on private individuals, private businesses or other private organizations that are not within the authority of the legislature of each province but have the right to access the s96 courts.

The B.C. Appeal Court agreed but widened the exemption.

The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that British Columbia court fees

Vilardell v. Dunham, 2009 BCSC 434 (CanLII). SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA <https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc434/2009bcsc434.html>
Vilardell v. Dunham, 2013 BCCA 65 (CanLII). COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA <https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2013/2013bcca65/2013bcca65.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQAbY291cnQgZmVlcyB1bmNvbnN0aXR1dGlvbmFsAAAAAAE&resultIndex=4>

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA - Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General) - <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14375/index.do>
[61]                          The contention that this hearing fee regime promotes proportionality and efficiency by weeding out unmeritorious cases ... does not answer the findings of the trial judge that it unconstitutionally prevents access to the courts.
[68]                          The proper remedy is to declare the hearing fee scheme as it stands unconstitutional
[80] The majority finds that the hearing fees do fall within the powers of a province to make laws in relation to the administration of justice in the province [which is exactly what is stated in section 92. 14 of the Constitution Act 1867]  but that they are nevertheless unconstitutional when they cause undue hardship to some litigants and effectively prevent their access to courts.
[104]                      The majority holds that the hearing fee scheme is unconstitutional because it “places an undue hardship on litigants and impedes the right of British Columbians to bring legitimate cases to court”

Since then The Province of British Columbia has reintroduced the enactments dealing with court fees that falls under their jurisdiction and is applicable to those classes of subjects enumerated under section 92 of the Constitution Act and no one else!

The Magna Carta is still in good standing and so is the Supreme Court of Canada ruling when the people involved are not enumerated as a class of subject under section 92 of the Constitution Act.

TRIBUNALS

"Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that tribunal appears to be impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455. In Re Tip-PaHands Enterprises, Inc., 27 B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)

Remembering that TRIBUNALS are only applicable to the province that regulates them!

The TRIBUNALS are not applicable to those not enumerated as classes of subjects under of the constitution.

Therefore if you are a private individual and not a classes of subjects of the province, TRIBUNALS are not applicable.

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT [SBC 2004] CHAPTER 45 <http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/04045_01>

Tribunals’ custom made to protect the government illegally when the government violates your rights!

We need to stop using these kangaroo courts!

Discretion to refer questions of law to court
43 (2) If a question of law, including a constitutional question, is raised by a party in a tribunal proceeding, on the request of a party or on its own initiative, at any stage of an application the tribunal may refer that question to the court in the form of a stated case. (If a question of law comes up, the person in charge of the Tribunal has the discretion to decide if the question of law needs to be addressed or not. Where in the Constitution Act 1867 does anyone have the authority to decide a question of law without submitting it to a court?)

Tribunal without jurisdiction over constitutional questions
44 (1) The tribunal does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions. (Of what use is a Tribunal that simply ignores constitutional questions?)

Tribunal without jurisdiction over Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms issues
45 (1) The tribunal does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions relating to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
How about this one as an indication of the conspiracy, a Tribunal In the Province of British Columbia and can simply ignore the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms violations.

Discretion to decline jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code
46.1 (1) The tribunal may decline jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code in any matter before it. Here we have a Tribunal that can simply decline jurisdiction over anyone seeking the application of the human rights code?
$25,000 for 23 minutes

According to the case below a private individual assumed to be enumerated as a class of subject under provincial or federal authority would be a clear case of government agents trespassing into the private individual’s affairs and the detention is worth one thousand dollars per minute of detention. Plus any fees off the tacitly agreed to fee schedule.

741 F.2d 336
James C. TREZEVANT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TAMPA, a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
James C. TREZEVANT, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF TAMPA, a municipal corporation, Hillsborough County
Board of Criminal Justice, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 83-3370, 83-3038.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Sept. 6, 1984.
Robert V. Williams, Tampa, Fla., for James C. Trezevant.
Chris W. Altenbernd, Tampa, Fla., for defendants-appellees in No. 83-3370.
Bernard C. Silver, Asst. City Atty., Tampa, Fla., City of Tampa.
Donald G. Greiwe, Chris W. Altenbernd, Tampa, Fla., for Hillsborough County Bd. of Criminal Justice.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before FAY, VANCE and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:
1. In Florida a motorist who receives a traffic citation may sign a promise to appear or post a bond pending court disposition. Mr. Trezevant elected to post a bond, had the necessary cash with him to do so, but found himself in a holding cell behind bars. Feeling that such a procedure deprived him of his civil rights (to remain at liberty), he brought this action. The jury agreed with his contentions and we affirm.
2. This matter was tried before the Honorable William J. Castagna, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, beginning on October 20, 1983. The amended complaint then before the trial court contained four counts. Count I charged that the City of Tampa and Officer Eicholz deprived Mr. Trezevant of his civil rights by improperly arresting him. Count II similarly charged the Hillsborough County Board of Criminal Justice ("HBCJ") and Deputy Edwards with improperly incarcerating Mr. Trezevant. Counts III and IV were included as pendent common law and state law claims against the same defendants. Count III was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff and Count IV was disposed of on a motion for directed verdict against the plaintiff.1 The jury returned a verdict of $25,000 in favor of the plaintiff and against the HCBJ and the City of Tampa. The individual defendants were absolved of all liability.
3. The case is now before this court on cross appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Mr. Trezevant has appealed the amount of attorney's fees awarded to him and the City of Tampa and the HBCJ have appealed the judgment against them. The parties have raised multiple issues on appeal but we find that a determination of three is dispositive of the entire matter. These three issues are whether the evidence supports the verdict rendered by the jury; whether the amount of the verdict rendered is excessive; and whether the trial court erred in the amount of attorney's fees awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.

FACTS
4. On the morning of April 23, 1979, the plaintiff, James C. Trezevant, was en route from his home in northwest Hillsborough County to his office in central Tampa. When he reached the intersection of Habana Avenue and Columbus Drive he stopped for a red light, he was third in line at the intersection. When the light changed, Mr. Trezevant and the two cars in front of him proceeded through the intersection. Just south of the intersection the other two cars came to a sudden stop and turned into a parking lot. In order to avoid a collision, Mr. Trezevant came to a screeching halt. Having avoided an accident, he then proceeded on. Six or seven blocks later, Mr. Trezevant was stopped by Officer Eicholz of the Tampa police department and was issued a citation for reckless driving.2 Officer Eicholz explained to Mr. Trezevant that if Trezevant did not sign the citation he would have to post a bond. Mr. Trezevant elected to go to central booking and post a bond.
5. Central booking has two entrances. In 1979, one of the entrances was used by bail bondsmen and lawyers to post bail bonds. Through a series of halls, this entrance leads to a glass window adjacent to the central booking desk. The only other entrance was used by policemen who were taking arrestees to be booked. This second entrance opened into a large room adjacent to the booking desk. Officer Eicholz escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking and when they arrived he frisked Mr. Trezevant and took him through the door normally used by policemen with arrestees in custody. Officer Eicholz walked up to the central booking desk and presented the jailer on duty with Mr. Trezevant and with the citations that Mr. Trezevant had refused to sign. The jailer took Mr. Trezevant's valuables and his belt and shoes and placed Mr. Trezevant in a holding cell until he could be processed. Mr. Trezevant was in the holding cell for a total of twenty-three minutes.
6. Mr. Trezevant always had enough cash to bond himself out. No one ever told Mr. Trezevant what he was being incarcerated for; he was not allowed to call an attorney before he was incarcerated; and, he was incarcerated with other persons who were under arrest for criminal violations. Further, while he was being held in the holding cell, Mr. Trezevant suffered severe back pain and his cries for medical assistance were completely ignored.
7. Mr. Trezevant's complaint centers around the fact that he was incarcerated for a civil infraction. It is true that because Mr. Trezevant could not produce his vehicle registration he could have been arrested. However, it is also true that no one ever thought that Mr. Trezevant was not the owner of the car he was driving. The only reason that he was escorted to central booking was that he had elected to post a bond for the civil infraction of reckless driving. Officer Eicholz consistently maintained that he did not arrest Mr. Trezevant.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
8. The City of Tampa and the HBCJ contend that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in their favor. A directed verdict decides contested substantive issues as a matter of law, thus we apply the same standard as was applied by the district court:
9. Courts view all the evidence, together with all logical inferences flowing from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party....
10. "... [I]f there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury."
11. Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969)).
12. Applying this standard to the case at bar, the City of Tampa and HBCJ would have us find that there was no evidence of a policy that caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. They would each have us look at their actions in this matter individually. The City of Tampa contends that Officer Eicholz properly escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking and turned him over to HBCJ for processing. The City argues that once Officer Eicholz reached the booking desk and handed the citations to the deputy on duty, the City was absolved of all further responsibility. Even though Officer Eicholz was present and observed that Mr. Trezevant was being incarcerated, the City believes that Officer Eicholz had no responsibility to object to the incarceration.
13. The HBCJ, on the other hand, argues that it did nothing wrong because all that its personnel did was accept a prisoner from Officer Eicholz on citations that were marked for arrest.3 The HBCJ would have us hold that their deputy did not do anything wrong because he believed in good faith that Mr. Trezevant was under arrest and that the deputy had no obligation to make any inquiry of Officer Eicholz concerning Mr. Trezevant's status. We cannot agree with either the city or the HBCJ.
14. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently dealt with a similar legal issue. In Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1982), a warrant was issued and Mr. Garris was arrested even though a follow-up investigation prior to Mr. Garris' arrest had revealed that the charges against Mr. Garris were without substance. The Court found that while the City of Fort Worth Police Department had a policy that required follow-up investigations by a second police officer, there was no policy to coordinate the follow-up investigations with the original investigation so as to prevent the arrest of innocent people:
15. There was no policy or method providing for cross-referencing of information within the department to prevent 'unfounded' arrests such as occurred here, nor was there a policy providing for the follow-up investigator ... to check with the original investigator ..., who in this case was aware of Rowland's intention to arrest Garris and could have prevented such action. In summary, the record establishes that during this entire police operation, leading up to Garris' unlawful arrest, numerous mistakes occurred, all of which resulted from various officers carrying out the policies and procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department.
16. Garris, 678 F.2d at 1275. We find this reasoning to be persuasive.
17. In the case at bar, Mr. Trezevant's incarceration was the result of numerous mistakes which were caused by the policemen and deputies carrying out the policies and procedures of the City of Tampa and the HBCJ. There was certainly sufficient evidence for the jury to find, as it did, that pursuant to official policy Officer Eicholz escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking where he was to be incarcerated until the HBCJ personnel could process the paper work for his bond. We cannot view the actions of Officer Eicholz and the jailer in a vacuum. Each was a participant in a series of events that was to implement the official joint policy of the City of Tampa and the HBCJ.4 The failure of the procedure to adequately protect the constitutional rights of Mr. Trezevant was the direct result of the inadequacies of the policy established by these defendants. The trial court correctly denied the motions for directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury.
18. In Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir.1984), this court explained that a municipality may be liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) if unconstitutional action is taken to implement or execute a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or officially adopted and promulgated decision. Gilmere at 901. Liability may also attach where the unconstitutional deprivation is "visited pursuant to government 'custom' even though such custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels." Gilmere at 901 (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018 at 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, rev'g in part Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). However, the "official policy or custom must be the moving force of the constitutional violation" before civil liability will attach under Sec. 1983. Gilmere, 737 F.2d at 901 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)).
19. In Gilmere, the plaintiff based her claim on the theory that the constitutional deprivation was the result of official custom; she made no claim that it was the result of official policy. However, our court found that the evidence conclusively showed that the municipal defendant had no official custom that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation. In the case at bar, however, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Mr. Trezevant's unconstitutional incarceration was the result of an official policy. Officer Eicholz escorted Mr. Trezevant to central booking and the HBCJ deputies then processed Mr. Trezevant in the normal course of business and in accordance with what they considered to be governmental policy. The fact that no motorist prior to Mr. Trezevant had elected to not sign a citation but rather post a bond is hardly justification for having no procedure. The record is devoid of any explanation as to why Mr. Trezevant was not allowed to use the entrance and window routinely used by attorneys and bondsmen. The imposition of liability on these municipal defendants is in full compliance with the standards explained in Gilmere.

THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD
20. The defendants have also challenged the amount of the award and contend that the amount is excessive. The standard for review of this issue was stated in Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981):5
21. In order for an award to be reduced, 'the verdict must be so gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right reason.' Machado v. States Marine-Isthmian Agency, Inc., 411 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir.1969). The Court 'will not disturb an award unless there is a clear showing that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law.' Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir.1970). The award, in order to be overturned must be 'grossly excessive' or 'shocking to the conscience.' La-Forest v. Autoridad de las Fuentas Fluviales, 536 F.2d 443 (1st Cir.1976).
22. There was evidence of Mr. Trezevant's back pain and the jailer's refusal to provide medical treatment and Mr. Trezevant is certainly entitled to compensation for the incarceration itself and for the mental anguish that he has suffered from the entire episode. This award does not "shock the court's conscience" nor is it "grossly excessive" or "contrary to right reason." Finally, there is no indication that the jury considered this amount to be punitive as opposed to compensatory.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
23. Mr. Trezevant has challenged the trial court's determination to sever the time spent on the unsuccessful counts from the fee award and its determination not to enhance the fee award. In the order on fees, the trial court expressly considered the various factors delineated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), and also found that the pendent claims had been "clearly without merit".
24. The United States Supreme Court has recently interpreted 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. It held:
25. [T]he extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.
26. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1943, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
27. The trial court correctly recognized that the fee award should exclude the time spent on unsuccessful claims except to the extent that such time overlapped with related successful claims. The court then excluded the time spent on the unsuccessful claims because those claims were clearly without merit. Finally, the court considered the award in light of the work performed in this case and found that the award was a reasonable fee for the services performed. We find that the trial judge correctly applied the law and did not abuse his discretion.

CONCLUSION
28. For the reasons stated, we find that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence; the verdict was not excessive; and, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
1) This ruling has not been appealed
2) Officer Eicholz issued a total of three citations: (1) reckless driving, (2) failure to produce a motor vehicle registration certificate, and (3) refusal to sign a traffic citation. The parties agreed that the third citation was a nullity there being no such offense
3) Some confusion surrounds the three citations. The jury could have concluded that Officer Eicholz had not completed the citations until after Mr. Trezevant was placed in the holding cell. The check showing that Mr. Trezevant had been arrested was apparently a mistake
4) The City of Tampa was one member of the group that supervised the HBCJ
5) Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981). Del Casal was decided on January 16, 1981, and, so, is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit
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